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UNION PACIFIC FUELS, INC. v. FERC: THE FERC's
ABILITY TO ABROGATE NATURAL GAS
TRANSPORTATION CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
"[Tihe law of contracts permeates every aspect of our society."' It reaches
into our daily activities, such as, employment, purchases, and sale of goods.2
When the language of a contract is not drafted in a clear and specific manner,
the intentions of the parties' bargain may be jeopardized. By using careful
draftsmanship, parties to contracts for transportation of natural gas can avoid
such a possibility.
When drafting a contract for the services of a natural gas pipeline, several
doctrines, if followed, ensure that the bargained risk allocation will not be abro-
gated by an act of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC" or
"Commission"). The Mobile-Sierra doctrine3 and the Memphis Clause4 were
discussed in Union Pacific Fuels, Inc. v. FERC5 ("Union Pacific"). In Union
Pacific, parties to a natural gas contract anticipated intervention by the FERC.
In this case, the FERC interpreted the contract in a manner counter to the
parties' intent. This Note, while analyzing the Union Pacific case, focuses on
the influences that major doctrines, such as the Mobile-Sierra doctrine and the
Memphis Clause, have on a drafter of a natural gas transportation contract. Part
II provides a basic overview of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, introducing the
reasons for the enactment of the FERC Order No. 636,6 while evaluating
changes the Order made to the industry. Part III discusses the factual and proce-
1. JOHN CALAMARI & JOSEPH PERILLO, HORNBOOK ON CONTRACTS 5 (3rd ed. 1987). This book pro-
vides a general discussion of the law of contracts. See also SCOTT AND LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY
(2nd ed. 1993).
2. HORNBOOK ON CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 5.
3. The Mobile-Sierra doctrine "imposes a higher standard on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion before it can abrogate private contracts under section five of the [Natural Gas Act]." Joint Initial Brief of
Petitioners at xvi, Union Pac. Fuels, Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (No. 93-1463). The Natural
Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(d) [hereinafter "NGA"], "regulate[s] the transportation and sale of natural gas in
interstate commerce." MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 666 (9th ed. 1994). The subject matter of section
five of the NGA, deals with fixing rates and charges by the Commission and the determination of cost of
production or transportation. 15 U.S.C. § 717(d) (1997).
4. This doctrine provides parties the opportunity to allow the FERC to change a contract if the contract
anticipates such intervention. Union Pac. Fuels, Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d 157, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
5. See id.
6. Order No. 636, Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implement-
ing Transportation Under Part 284 of The Commission's Regulations, and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipe-
lines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, III F.E.R.C. STATS. & REGS., Preambles & 30,939, 57 Fed. Reg.
13,267 (1992) (codified at 18 C.F.R. Part 284) [hereinafter Order No. 636].
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dural background of Union Pacific, while analyzing the effects of Order No.
636 on both parties. Part IV scrutinizes Union Pacific, postulating implications
on future contracts and evaluating the court's holding. Part V summarizes the
drafting lessons to learn from the Union Pacific decision. This Note concludes
that: (1) the Union Pacific court properly decided the case by enforcing the
contract as written; (2) the FERC's power should not be curtailed simply be-
cause parties fail to draft their contract to clearly reflect the intended allocation
of risk; and (3) the drafters of natural gas transportation contracts can learn a
valuable lesson as to what interpretations are attached to various contract termi-
nology (such as the Memphis Clause) and thus avoid costly drafting errors.
II. BACKGROUND
A. In General
Contracts reflect the parties' agreement concerning the distribution of risk
allocation. When a contract is consummated, the parties meet to bargain for
mutually beneficial terms. They rely upon the terms in the contract, and use
those terms to make future business decisions. If the FERC has the authority to
abrogate such a private contract, large economic impacts on all companies
involved in the buying, selling, or transporting of natural gas could result. The
impact of the regulatory sword can cause economic harm to any party in the
agreement. Therefore, understanding the limitations placed on the Commission
in exercising this authority, while knowing how to avoid regulatory interven-
tion, is necessary for one who drafts contracts with natural gas pipelines. One
such limitation on the Commission's power to interfere with a private contract
is known as the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.7
On February 27, 1956, the United States Supreme Court issued two land-
mark decisions8 establishing what is known as the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.
These opinions restrained the FERC's authority to interfere with an existing
private contract Under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine the Commission has the
authority to abrogate the contract only if the public interest demands it."0 The
doctrine was subsequently modified to allow contract intervention by the Com-
mission when parties anticipate such intervention in their contract. Therefore,
the FERC may not interfere with a private agreement unless: 1) public interest
demands it; or 2) the parties stipulate through contract to allow such interven-
tion by the FERC.
7. See Mobile-Sierra doctrine, supra note 3.
8. See FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas
Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
9. See id. Prior to the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, all the Commission needed to interfere with private con-
tractual arrangements was a belief that the proposed rate was 'just and reasonable.' See Mobile Gas Corp.,
350 U.S. at 337, 338.
10. See Union Pac., 129 F.3d at 161.
[Vol. 33:931
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B. Development of the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine
1. United Gas Pipeline Company v. Mobile Gas Service Corporation
In 1953, Mobile Gas Service Corporation ("Mobile") brought an action
against the United Gas Pipeline Company ("United") due to United's unilateral
action to raise its rates." The contract at issue, signed in 1946, provided for
Mobile to acquire its gas from United at a set price for ten years. 2 United
properly filed the contract with the Federal Power Commission ("FPC").3 Sev-
en years after the original contract was filed, United filed a new rate sched-
ule'4 with the FPC, requesting an increase in its resale rates to Mobile." Mo-
bile argued that United acted improperly by failing to obtain Mobile's consent
to the change. Mobile claimed United could not unilaterally change the agreed
upon contract rate."
The sole issue was whether it was unconstitutional to interpret the Natural
Gas Act ("NGA") to allow a natural gas company to unilaterally, through action
of the FPC, change the rate of an existing contract. 7 The Supreme Court stat-
ed that the NGA can be explained as "defining and implementing the powers of
the Commission to review rates set initially by natural gas companies, and there
is nothing to indicate that they were intended to do more."'" The Court held
under the NGA, that a natural gas company could not, without the consent of
the distributor, change the rate of a long-term contract. 9 The significance of
the decision was its ruling that the FPC should not have the authority to abro-
gate a contract of two private parties unless the contract rate is so low that the
public interest would be adversely affected20
11. See Mobile Gas Corp., 350 U.S. at 335.
12. See id.
13. In 1977, as a result of the Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 402(a), 91
Stat. 565, 583-84, the regulatory functions of the Federal Power Commission was transferred to the newly
created Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7382f (1994)).
14. The FERC is responsible for determining whether rates are just and reasonable:
Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint of any State,
municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, shall find that any rate, charge, or clas-
sification demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any natural-gas company in connection with
any transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any
rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreason-
able, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable
rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in
force, and shall fix the same by order.
15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1997).
15. See Mobile Gas Corp., 350 U.S. at 335.
16. See id. at 336.
17. See id. at 337.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20.
The basic power of the Commission is that given by section 5(a) [of the NGA] to set aside and mod-
ify any rate or contract which it determines, after hearing, to be 'unjust, unreasonable, unduly dis-
criminatory, or preferential' ... it is simply the power to review rates and contracts made in the fust
instance by natural gas companies and, if they are determined to be unlawful, to remedy them.
Mobile Gas Corp., 350 U.S. at 341.
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2. Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Company
Unlike Mobile in the case just discussed, Sierra Pacific Power Company
distributed electricity, not natural gas, to consumers in Nevada and Califor-
nia.21 A dispute arose as the result of a fifteen-year contract to purchase power
from Pacific Gas and Electric ("PG&E").2 In 1953, just five years into the
contract, PG&E unilaterally filed a request for a rate increase with the FPC,23
Like United in Mobile, PG&E failed to obtain the consent of Sierra.24 The
court's reasoning for its decision was similar to that in Mobile. The court ruled
that the reason for the FPC's existence is to change an existing rate contract
only if it is unjust, unreasonable, or preferential.' The court concluded the
issue is not whether a rate is low, but whether it is so low as to adversely affect
the public interest.26
3. United Gas Pipeline Company v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water
Two years after the Mobile and Sierra cases were decided, the United
States Supreme Court decided to further clarify the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. At
issue in United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Memphis Light Gas & Water was a long
term gas contract between United27 and Memphis Light, Gas and Water Com-
pany, a division of Texas Gas Transmission Corporation (Texas Gas),' which
involved a mandated use of a rate schedule, rather than negotiate a specific
price The price was to reflect the Seller's Rate Schedule or "any effective
superseding rate schedules, on file with the Federal Power Commission."
In 1955, without the permission of Texas Gas, United filed a new rate
schedule with the Commission to increase the price of its gas.' The Commis-
sion ordered a hearing in which Texas Gas argued United's request ran contrary
to the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.' The Commission distinguished the case from
Mobile, arguing that the contracts differed substantively.33 The contract in Mo-
bile involved a specific price whereas the contract in Memphis was ambiguous
as to the calculation of how the price would be computed.' 4 The Commission
could follow the rate schedule proposed by United at the time of contract for-
mation, or base the price on any "going rate" filed with the Commission? The
21. See Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. at 351.
22. See id. at 352.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. This is the condition precedent to the Commission's exercise of its power under section 206(a). See
id. at 353.
26. See id.
27. United Gas Pipeline Corporation is the same company involved in the Mobile case.
28. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103, 106 (1958).
29. See id. at 105.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 106.
32. See id.
33. See Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div., 358 U.S. at 110.
34. See id.
35. Id.
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contract bound United to provide gas to Texas Gas for the length of the con-
tract at the going rate?3 In Mobile, the Court held that United bargained away
its right to change the rate of the contract. 7
Memphis refined the Mobile-Sierra doctrine by holding that the Commis-
sion has the authority to modify a contractual rate schedule and allow a compa-
ny to amend its express contract rates. This can be done without the affected
party's consent, as long as intervention is an option contemplated in the con-
tract. In Memphis, the parties placed a clause in the contract which anticipated
using prices set by the Commission." By refining the Mobile-Sierra doctrine,
the Court acknowledged the authority of the Commission to abrogate or modify
contractsY9 Not only could the Commission interfere with the contract if the
public interest demanded, but it could now intervene if the contracts anticipated
intervention.
C. Order No. 636
The FERC's power to interfere with private contract rates by way of the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine has been the subject of recent challenges to FERC ac-
tions." Over the last two decades, there has been a movement to deregulate
the natural gas industry,' which has resulted in a progression of FERC Orders
aimed at deregulation. These orders have had a major impact on the transpor-
tation of natural gas.
Order No. 636 was perhaps the most significant of these orders, which the
Commission proposed in 1993 attempting to level the playing field in the natu-
ral gas market. "Order No. 636 establishes a new policy on a national basis that
usage charges on competing pipelines should be a neutral factor in competition
between gas sellers."'43 By forcing the pipeline companies to provide
unbundled services,' the Commission hoped to achieve a competitive market.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. This clause has come to be called the "Memphis Clause." Union Pac., 129 F.3d at 160.
39. The Court explained the difference between this case and Mobile by saying:
The important and indeed decisive difference between this case and Mobile is that in Mobile one
party to a contract was asserting that the Natural Gas Act somehow gave it the right unilaterally to
abrogate its contractual undertaking, whereas here [Texas Gas] seeks simply to assert, in accordance
with the procedures specified by the Act, rights expressly reserved to it by contract.
Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div., 358 U.S. 107 at 112.
40. See Union Pac., 129 F.3d at 161.
41. See generally Robert J. Michaels, The New Age of Natural Gas How the Regulators Brought Compe-
tition, REGULATION MAGAZINE <http.//www.cato.org/pubs/regulationregl6nle.html> (visited Feb. 11, 1998)
(providing an overview of the history of natural gas regulation and the progression towards deregulation).
42. Order No. 436 imposed an open access commitment on pipelines wanting to provide gas transporta-
tion. See Order No. 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, III F.E.R.C.
STATS & REGS. 130,665, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,844 (1985); see also Order No. 500, Regulation of Natural Gas
Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, III F.E.R.C. STAT & REG. 30,761, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334 (1987).
For a general discussion of Order No. 436 and Order No. 500, see William A. Mogel, A History of Regulation
of The Natural Gas Industry, in Fifth Annual Federal Energy Regulation Conference Materials (October 30,
1992) at 20-35.
43. Kern River Transmission Co. Order Accepting Revised Compliance Filing, Denying Rehearing and
Granting Clarification 64 F.E.R.C. 61,049 at 61,414. (1993).
44. Unbundling is "separation of transportation, sales and storage services by an interstate pipeline as
1998]
5
Drain: Union Pacific Fuels, Inc. v. FERC: The FERC's Ability to Abrogate
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1997
TULSA LAW JO URNAL [Vol. 33:931
The Commission believed Order No. 636 would facilitate the move away from
regulation and towards competition in the natural gas market.'
Pipeline charges consist of the reservation or demand charge,' and the
usage charge.47 The reservation charge must be paid to reserve space in the
pipeline for an agreed upon period. This fee is for renting the capacity to trans-
port gas regardless of the amount of gas actually transported. The usage charge
is paid when the gas is transported. In theory, by removing the fixed costs from
the pipeline usage charge and placing it in the reservation charge, the usage
charge of the pipeline is lowered to a point where it is inconsequential to the
overall price, thereby facilitating competition.'
One part of Order No. 636 was the mandatory requirement that interstate
pipelines use the Straight Fixed Variable ("SFV")49 rate design.50 Due to Or-
der No. 636, "interstate pipelines are [now] required to use [the] SFV method
for cost classification, allocation and rate design so as to recover all fixed costs
in the reservation charge portion of a two part transportation rate."'" If a com-
pany using the pipeline actually transports all the gas reserved in the reservation
charge, the rate method is of no consequence to the total price.52 The rate
method becomes a factor only when the amount of gas reserved exceeds the
amount transported. Unlike the Modified Fixed Variable, a pipeline using the
SFV rate is assured of recovering all of its fixed cost regardless of how much
gas is transported. The SFV is a pipeline-friendly rate method.
mandated by... Order No. 636." Joint Initial Brief of Petitioners at xvii, Union Pac. (93-1463).
45. See 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 at 13,268 (1992).
46. A Reservation Charge is a "demand charge for reserving firm transportation capacity on a pipeline
whether or not gas is actually transported." Joint Initial Brief of Petitioners at xvi, Union Pac. (93-1463).
Where the customer purchases finn service, a pipeline may impose a reservation fee or charge on a
shipper as a condition of service... [i]f a reservation fee is charged, it must recover all fixed costs
attributable to the firm transportation service, unless the Commission permits the pipeline to recover
the fixed costs in the volumetric portion of the two-part rate.
157.18 C.F.R. § 284.8 (d).
47. Usage Charge is "[a] commodity charge applied to the amount of gas actually transported." Joint
Initial Brief of Petitioners at xvi, Union Pac. (93-1463).
48. See 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 at 13,268.
49. See 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 at 13,295. In a Straight fixed /Variable (SFV) rate design, "all fixed costs
are assigned to the reservation charge, which does not vary with use, and all variable costs are assigned to the
usage charge, which does [vary according to use]." Union Pac., 129 F.3d at 159.
50. Rate Design is "[tihe method of classifying pipeline fixed and variable costs between reservation and
usage charges, resulting in the allocation of such costs over projected volumes of service to determine the
specific rates to be charged for such services." Joint Initial Brief of Petitioners at xvi, Union Pac. (93-1463).
51. Kern River Gas Transmission Co., 62 F.E.R.C. 61,191, 62,254. Fixed Costs are "[c]osts included
in the cost of service of a pipeline which does not tend to fluctuate with the amount of natural gas flowing
through the system." Joint Initial Brief of Petitioners at xvi, Union Pac. (93-1463).
52. Kern River's Transmittal Letter explained the rate making process as follows:
[T]he Commission has often recognized, a rate design change is not properly considered as a dis-
count. Rather, as the last step in the rate making process, differing rate designs may be employed to
collect the same revenue requirement, but the amount to be collected is not intended to change as a
result. Indeed, depending on a customer's usage levels, a rate design change could result in an in-
creased level of overall charges.
Deferred Joint Appendix at 10, 11, Union Pac. (93-1463).
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Background Facts of Union Pacific Fuels, Inc. v. FERC
Prior to the promulgation of Order No. 636, the Kern River Gas Transmis-
sion Company ("Kern River") proposed to construct and operate an interstate
pipeline from Wyoming to California 3 In 1985, Kern River, as required by
section 7 of the Natural Gas Act,5" submitted a traditional application5 to the
FERC requesting certificate to construct a pipeline.6 WyCal, a competitor of
Kern River, submitted an optional expedited certificate procedure ("OECP")57
proposal for pipeline construction and operation. WyCal's plan proposed to
cover the same geographic area and function in the same manner as Kern
River's proposal. By using an OECP, WyCal had an opportunity to obtain ap-
proval before Kern River could complete the traditional section 7 process.
Because Kern River did not want to lose the project to a competitor, it
chose to abandon the traditional NGA section 7 application process and also
submit an OECP for FERC approval.51 The OECP places the risk of the pro-
ject on the pipeline, in this case, Kern River. The Kern River project was ap-
proved by the FERC on January 24, 1990, and Kern River commenced con-
struction of the pipeline.59
Several companies negotiated contracts with Kern River for use of the
pipeline shortly before its approval. The contracts at issue were signed by Un-
ion Pacific Fuels ("Union Pacific") and Mobile on December 15, 1989. These
negotiated fifteen-year contracts mandated use of a Modified Fixed Variable
Rate ("MFV"). 6°
An understanding of two specific clauses in the Union Pacific contract is
necessary to properly analyze the FERC's decision. First, the contract states that
neither party is allowed to seek a unilateral change to the contractual rate. Spe-
cifically, the contract states, "notwithstanding the foregoing, neither Shipper nor
Transporter shall without the consent of the other party seek to change as to
53. See 62 F.E.R.C. 61,191 at 62,251.
54. See 18 C.F.R. §§ 157.100-157.106 (1998).
55. A traditional application process takes longer and requires additional work and risk to the pipeline.
Unlike the traditional application, with the optional certificate ("OECP") the applicant is "not required to
prove the public convenience and necessity in the areas of adequate supply, adequate markets, facilities, and
cost of construction." Joint Initial Brief of Petitioners at 8-9 Union Pac. (93-1463).
56. Mojave Pipeline Company submitted a traditional application for pipeline construction at the same
time in the same location. The Commission consolidated Kern River and Mojave's request for pipeline con-
struction. 50 F.E.R.C. 1 61,069 at 61,141.
57. Established in Order No. 436. "A pipeline is eligible for an optional certificate if it agrees to provide
nondiscriminatory open access transportation. . . and if it is willing to assume the economic risk of the pro-
ject .... " Id. at 61,149.
58. See Union Pac., 129 F.3d at 160.
59. 50 F.E.R.C. 61,069.
60. Deferred Joint Appendix at 33, Union Pac. (93-1463). In the Modified Fixed Variable rate design,
"some of the fixed costs are assigned to the reservation charge, but some of the fixed costs, including return
on equity and income taxes, are assigned to the usage charge along with the variable costs." Union Pac., 129
F.3d at 159.
1998]
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shipper the modified fixed variable rate design."' The language expresses an
intent between Union Pacific and Kern River, which was part of the bargain, to
keep the contracted rate structure in place.
Another clause at issue in the Union Pacific contract acknowledges possi-
ble FERC interference with the contract. The clause, which anticipates FERC
intervention of the contract with regard to the rate structure, is known as a
Memphis Clause.62 The Memphis Clause in the Union Pacific contract stated,
"if [the] FERC requires a change in cost allocation, classification, or rate design
as to the rates for service on Transporter's System, then Transporter shall have
the right to immediately reflect any necessary changes in this Agreement, in-
cluding any reallocation of costs .... ."' This clause, which was standard to
gas contracts prior to Order No. 636 became an issue after the FERC promul-
gated the order.
B. The Effect of Order No. 636 on Kern River
In order to "ensure that transportation service is equal in quality for all gas
supplies," the Commission, in 1993, promulgated Order No. 636. Shortly
thereafter, Kern River requested for the Commission to implement Order No.
636 and change the rate method from a MFV to a SFW. 5 The difference be-
tween a MFV and a SFV rate is the time at which the fixed rates will be
charged to the user of the transportation system. If the pipeline user does not
expect to transport one-hundred percent of the amount it reserved, the MFV is
better. If it intends to transport the total gas it reserves, it does not make any
difference, either method is appropriate. The change to the SFV would have
benefitted Kern River, since it could recover all fixed costs in the reservation
charge, iegardless of the amount of gas transported, rather than recover the
fixed costs in the usage charge.
The MFV rate method places less risk on Union Pacific and Mobile than a
SFV rate. With the MFV, the company using the pipeline would not have to
pay all fixed costs in the reservation charge; thus, exact estimates of usage are
not necessary. Mobile and Union Pacific wanted their rate method to remain at
MFV. Because the intention at the time of the contracts was to maintain a MFV
rate method, which was included in part of the contractual language, Kern River
requested that Mobile and Union Pacific's rate method remain at MFV.'
If Union Pacific and Mobile were allowed to retain a MFV rate method,
other Kern River customers argued that it would be unfair. These companies
61. Deferred Joint Appendix at 33, Union Pac. (93-1463).
62. The Memphis Clause expresses both parties acknowledgment that the price is subject to FERC regu-
lation. Union Pac., 129 F.3d at 160, 161.
63. Deferred Joint Appendix at 33, Union Pac. (93-1463).
64. Order No. 636., supra note 6.
65. See id.
66. Mobile and Union Pacific argued that "[C.F.R. §] 284.8(d) as amended by Order No. 636... re-
flects the ability of the FERC to grant a waiver from the SFV rate design." Joint Reply Brief of Petitioners at
11, Union Pac. (93-1463).
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wanted the rate method to remain at MFV for all Kern River customers. Some
companies in contractual relations with Kern River had provisions in their con-
tracts mandating that Kern River could not charge them a higher rate than any
other customer."7 Thus, if Kern River lowered its rates for Mobile and Union
Pacific, it would have to lower rates for companies with this contractual provi-
sion. The inverse is also true. Kern River could not raise rates for these compa-
nies without raising the rates for Union Pacific and Mobile. Understandably,
such companies argued that if the Commission granted Kern River's rate
change, it would likewise be an unfair exercise of its authority.68
"[I]n order to achieve the broad public interest goals, underlying the
Commission's SFV policy, of minimizing distortions in the wellhead market
and thereby benefitting all gas consumers through lower prices and more abun-
dant supplies," '9 the Commission allowed Kern River to implement the rate
change method from MFV to SFV. However, it said the rate change would be
administered on all contracts, including the contracts with Mobile and Union
Pacific Fuels.70 The Commission explained that it would be unfair to imple-
ment a rate change impacting companies with "most favored nation" status,
while allowing Mobile and Union Pacific to escape the change. The FERC
stated that it would be unduly discriminatory to retain MFV rates for Mobile
and Union Pacific and run counter to the Commission's original goals of
switching to uniform implementation of SFV.'
The FERC pointed out that keeping the rates at MFV would be contrary to
the policy reasons for the enactment of Order No. 636 primarily trying to in-
crease competition at the wellhead. The FERC explained the competition be-
tween Kern River and its competitors would be unfair, since its usage rates
would be higher, and would contribute to market distortions.' They explained
that if Kern River were allowed to keep the MFV rate, its usage rates would be
$0.1852 per cubic foot. In comparison, the usage charge of Kern River's com-
petitors who used the SFV, would be $0.0165 per cubic foot.73 According to
the FERC, the passage of Order No. 636 was meant to prevent this type of
competitive distortion. 4
C. Procedural History Of Union Pacific Fuels, Inc. v. FERC
After the FERC issued its rule imposing a SFV rate method on Kern
River's customers, including Mobile and Union Pacific, the parties affected by
67. See Union Pac., 129 F.3d at 161.
68. See id.
69. D.C. Circuit Affirms FERC's Refusal To Allow Exceptions To SFV Rate Design In Kern River Order
No. 636 Restructuring Case, FosTER NATURAL GAS REPORT, (Foster Associates) Report No. 2157, 1997 WL
10342889 (quoting the FERC).
70. See 62 F.E.R.C. 61,191 at 62,261.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
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the FERC's decision appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals. The parties claimed the Commission exceeded its authority by abro-
gating rates of private contracts and failed to consider their intentions that the
rate structure remain at MFV.7 The cases were consolidated into one case,
which is represented by Union Pacific Fuels Inc.76
IV. ANALYSIS
The court in Union Pacific began by analyzing the FERC's decision to
change Kern River's rate method to SFV. It evaluated the decision to change
the rate method to determine whether the FERC's action was arbitrary and
capricious.7 In addition to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, Union Pa-
cific and Mobile argued that the FERC must also meet the higher standard of
Mobile-Sierra.7" As previously discussed, under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine the
FERC may only abrogate a private contract if public interest demands. The
court concluded the determination of whether the Mobile-Sierra doctrine applies
is dependant on the interpretation of the parties' contract.' The court gave
complete deference to the contract language, not the parties' intent in drafting
the contract. It is the parties' decision, the court explained, to include or ex-
clude language that contemplates intervention by the FERC.'
The court in Union Pacific envisioned three possible types of contract
construction." First, the contract may be drafted to permit rate changes but
provide for the FERC to review such changes. Second, it may be drafted to
restrict the power of the FERC and allow a change only if the rates are contrary
to the public interestY This approach would incorporate the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine into the contract. Lastly, the contract, may be written to allow the
FERC to change rate methods that are against public interest; it could allow
change if the rate is unjust or unreasonable." Instead of using one of these
types of contracts, Union Pacific left the interpretation to the Commission.
The contracts at issue in Union Pacific included language anticipating
intervention by the FERC, in other words, a Memphis Clause." The court de-
termined this anticipation of intervention rendered Mobile-Sierra inapplica-
75. See Union Pac., 129 F.3d at 159.
76. Consolidation reflects the interest of the following parties: Union Pacific Fuels, Inc., Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., Mobile Exploration & Producing U.S., Shell Western E&P Inc., Southern California Utility Pow-
er Pool, and Imperial Irrigation District. Joint Initial Brief of Petitioners at i, Union Pac. (93-1463).
77. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994) (stating that if a court of law is reviewing an agency action, the
court shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
78. See Mobile-Sierra doctrine supra note 3.
79. See Union Pac., 129 F.3d at 161.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. (quoting Papago v. Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
84. See Union Pac., 129 F.3d at 161.
[Vol. 33:931
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 33 [1997], Iss. 3, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol33/iss3/7
UNION PACIFIC FUELS, INC. v. FERC
ble.' "While [Union Pacific and Mobile] protest that boilerplate language ac-
knowledging rate changes by the FERC should not render the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine inapplicable... they do not explain why they could not have adopted
language that would simply and clearly have invoked Mobile-Sierra."" If Un-
ion Pacific wanted to keep the FERC from interfering with the contract unless
public interest demands, they should have drafted their contract to clearly adopt
this doctrine.
An argument can be made that the FERC was using its authority to inter-
fere with the private contracts between Kern River, Union Pacific, and Mobile.
The parties clearly agreed to no unilateral attempts to seek a rate modification
(of their contract) from the FERC. Since the end result allows the FERC to
change the intentions of the parties, one could argue that the FERC exceeded its
powers and abrogated the private contracts. If there was a true abrogation of the
contracts, the FERC would have to give reasons why the public interest would
demand such an abrogation.'
However, there is merit to the argument that the FERC went no further
than the language of the contract dictated and did not exceed its authority. This
is just the opposite of what Union Pacific and Mobile argued. The FERC did
not alter the Mobile-Sierra doctrine; it is alive and well. The court strictly en-
forced the language of the contract which allowed the FERC to intervene, while
neglecting the parties' intentions to keep the rate method at a MFV. None of
the parties to the contract sought a change in the rate structure. Kern River
sought modification of rates regarding other parties, not Union Pacific or Mo-
bile. Therefore, Kern River did not breach its contract with either Mobile or
Union Pacific. The intentions of the parties to keep the rate method were not
clearly expressed in the language of the contract since there was a conflict with
the Memphis Clause. Because of this conflict, the FERC made its decision
based on what would be best to advance competition in the natural gas market.
After Union Pacific, the Commission must still abide by the language of
the contract, unless they find it to be against the public interest.' By enforcing
the words of the parties' contract, the court encourages careful drafting of natu-
ral gas contracts to ensure that their intentions remain clear.
While it is encouraging that the court gave deference to the contract be-
tween the parties, it is somewhat alarming that the parties' intentions were
ignored. Although the Mobile-Sierra doctrine gives contracting parties limited
protection against FERC intervention, that protection can be minimized if the
contract anticipates FERC intervention by including a Memphis Clause. The
FERC indicates that the Memphis Clause trumps any other express provision in
the contract.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 161-162.
87. In this case, the FERC's position was that promoting competition in the natural gas market was a
sufficient reason to qualify for a public interest demand.
88. See Mobile-Sierra doctrine, supra note 3.
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Here, the court strictly enforced the words of the contract without looking
further to determine the intentions of the parties. Although the contract lan-
guage did not reflect the allocation of risk that was bargained for, a general rule
exists that a party is responsible for the language that is in the contract. A claim
that the language anticipating intervention by the FERC was simply boilerplate
language is no excuse for exemption from the terms of the contract. 9 The
power of the FERC should not be curtailed due to a party's failure to properly
draft a contract. This case reflects a willingness of the Commission to allow the
language of the contract to prevail in cases where requests are made. As the
Court stated in Mobile, "preserving the integrity of contracts .... permits the
stability of supply arrangements which all agree is essential to the health of the
natural gas industry.'" ° It will be the parties to the contract who control their
relationship.
V. CONCLUSION
Union Pacific provides an example of what can occur if the FERC's inter-
vention is not specifically addressed in the natural gas transportation contract.
The court stressed that although the parties to the contract intended to refrain
from unilateral requests to change the rate design, more weight will be given to
the Memphis Clause. The court sent a message to those drafting natural gas
transportation contracts that when clauses in a contract conflict, the FERC will
enforce the provision that best reflects the public interest demands such as the
Memphis Clause.9 "The parties could have, but did not adopt language that
expressly limited the FERC's right to change modified fixed variable [MFV] to
the public interest standard required by Mobile-Sierra."' A lesson to learn
from Union Pacific is to be specific when drafting a natural gas contract. If the
drafter wishes for the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to apply to the contract, it should
be included in the language of the contract. When writing the natural gas trans-
portation contract, there is no better way to preserve the contracting parties
intentions than to draft the contract language in a clear and specific manner.
Harold Glenn Drain
89. "One having the capacity to understand a written document who reads it, or, without reading it or
having it read to him, signs it, is bound by his signature." HORNBOOK ON CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 410.
(quoting Rossi v. Douglas, 100 A.2d 3, 7 (1953)).
90. See Mobile Gas Corp., 350 U.S. at 344.
91. See Union Pac., 129 F.3d at 161.
92. Id.
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